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1. INTRODUCTION 
Left-libertarian theories of justice hold that agents are full self-owners and that natural resources 
are owned in some egalitarian manner. Unlike most versions of egalitarianism, left-libertarianism 
endorses full self-ownership, and thus places specific limits on what others may do to one’s 
person without one’s permission. Unlike the more familiar right-libertarianism (which also 
endorses full self-ownership), it holds that natural resources—resources which are not the results 
of anyone's choices and which are necessary for any form of activity—may be privately 
appropriated only with the permission of, or with a significant payment to, the members of 
society. Like right-libertarianism, left-libertarianism holds that the basic rights of individuals are 
ownership rights. Such rights can endow agents—as liberalism requires—with spheres of 
personal liberty where they may each pursue their conceptions of “the good life”. Left-
libertarianism is promising because it coherently underwrites both some demands of material 
equality and some limits on the permissible means of promoting this equality. It is promising, 
that is, because it is a form of liberal egalitarianism. 
Left-libertarian theories have been propounded for over two centuries. Early exponents of 
some form of self-ownership combined with some form of egalitarian ownership of natural 
resources include: Hugo Grotius (1625), Samuel Pufendorf (1672), John Locke (1690), William 
Ogilvie (1781), Thomas Spence (1793), Thomas Paine (1795), Hippolyte de Colins (1835), 
François Huet (1853), Patrick E. Dove (1850, 1854), Herbert Spencer (1851), Henry George 
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(1879, 1892), and Léon Walras (1896).1 It is striking how much of the current debate about 
equality, liberty, and responsibility has already been addressed by these authors. 
Recent years have witnessed a revival of left-libertarian theorizing. Allan Gibbard (1976), 
Baruch Brody (1983), James Grunebaum (1987), Hillel Steiner (1994), Philippe Van Parijs 
(1995), and Michael Otsuka (1998) have each written works (included in whole or in part in this 
volume) that reflect the general spirit of left-libertarianism. 
There are many different forms that left-libertarianism can take, and this essay supplies a 
brief overview of the terrain.2 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
We shall focus, as is standard, on left-libertarianism as a theory of justice, where justice is 
understood to be concerned with legitimate (i.e., morally permissible) coercion. In this sense, an 
action is unjust if and only if others are morally permitted to coerce one not to perform it. Some 
just actions may be morally impermissible (e.g., refusing to help an elderly neighbor, where one 
has a moral obligation to help, but others are not morally permitted to coerce one to help), and 
(more controversially) some unjust actions may be morally permissible (e.g., stealing a car to 
save someone’s life). 
Libertarianism (both left and right) construes basic individual rights as property rights. 
We shall therefore focus on the ownership of things in the world. Here we must distinguish 
among beings with moral standing (beings that matter morally for their own sake), natural 
resources (unproduced resources, such as land, air, water, etc.), and artifacts (products). For 
simplicity, we shall initially assume that all beings with moral standing are agents (rational 
choosers), and we shall thus ignore the important and difficult problem of the status of children, 
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fetuses, and animals. Libertarianism (both left and right) is committed to full self-ownership for 
rational agents. It is less clear how other sorts of being with moral status are to be treated. 
For simplicity, we shall also begin by assuming that there is only one society (and thus 
ignore the problems of international boundaries) and only one generation (and thus ignore the 
problems that arise concerning the preservation of resources for future generations and the 
private transmission of wealth over generations). In a later section we shall relax these  
simplifying assumptions, and briefly discuss the issues that thereby arise. 
 
3. FULL SELF-OWNERSHIP 
Libertarianism (both left and right) holds that all agents are, initially at least (e.g., prior to 
engaging in any commitments or unjust actions), full self-owners, and that any violation of full 
self-ownership is unjust. The core idea of full self-ownership is that agents own themselves in 
just the same way that they can fully own inanimate objects. This maximal private ownership 
includes (1) full control rights over (power to grant and deny permission for) the use of their 
persons (e.g., what things are done to them), (2) full rights to transfer the rights they have to 
others (by sale, rental, gift, or loan), and (3) full payment immunities for the possession and 
exercise of these rights (ensuring, for example, that the other rights are not merely rented and that 
taxation is not owed for mere possession or exercise). 
At the core of full self-ownership are the constraints on how individuals may be used. 
Killing, torturing, or enslaving innocent individuals without their consent is unjust no matter how 
effective these actions are as means to equality or other moral goals. More generally, agents have 
the right to control the use of their person. There are some things (such as physical contact of 
various sorts) that are unjust when done to an agent without his/her consent, and those very 
things are just when the agent gives his/her consent.3 
4 
It is important to note that the thesis that violations of full self-ownership are unjust is 
much stronger than the less controversial idea that justice imposes constraints on how individuals 
may be treated without their permission. First, a constraint—against torture, for example—need 
not be based on a property right (which includes the power to waive the constraint). It might just 
be an impersonal constraint on conduct. The libertarian thesis of full self-ownership holds both 
that it is unjust to treat people in certain ways without their permission, and that it is just to do so 
with their permission (as long as no other rights are violated in the process). One can endorse the 
first claim without endorsing the second (viz., by viewing the specified treatment as unjust no 
matter whether or not the affected agent has consented). Doing this, however, requires rejecting 
the idea that people have a right to control the use of their person in the specified ways. Second, 
the assumption that some form of self-ownership imposes some waivable constraints on how one 
may be treated need not be the assumption that full self-ownership imposes such constraints. Full 
self-ownership gives agents various control rights over the use of their persons. But it also gives 
them rights to transfer those rights to others and various payment immunities. One can endorse a 
partial form of self-ownership (e.g., control rights) without endorsing full self-ownership (e.g. 
with full transfer rights). 
More specifically, one objection to full self-ownership concerns voluntary slavery. Full 
self-ownership includes not only first-order rights of control over the use of one’s person, but 
also the right (power) to transfer (e.g., by gift or sale) these rights to others. This seems to entail 
that one has the right to voluntarily enslave oneself, which strikes many as wildly implausible. 
(Involuntary enslavement, of course, violates full control self-ownership, and is not at issue 
here.) 
An important but generally unrecognized response to the objection about voluntary 
enslavement is that full self-ownership on its own does not entail that voluntary enslavement is 
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permitted by justice. Full self-ownership includes the right to transfer one’s rights over oneself, 
but it does not ensure that others have the right (power) to acquire these rights. Transfer of rights 
from one person to another (by exchange or by gift) requires that both that the transferor have the 
power to transfer the rights and consents to do so and that the transferee has the power to acquire 
the rights and consents to do so. Full self-ownership is thus compatible with no one having the 
power to acquire by transfer rights over another person. Full self-ownership ensures that one has 
the power to renounce (i.e., abandon) one’s rights over oneself (which does not require a 
recipient), and that one has the power to consensually transfer one’s rights to anyone who has the 
power to receive them. It does not, however, require that anyone have the power to receive them. 
That issue concerns the powers that others have with respect to one’s person (viz. the power to 
acquire rights over one under certain conditions.) Of course, most left-libertarians will hold that 
all agents initially have these powers to acquire rights over others (as well as over natural 
resources and artifacts), and so the objection is indeed applicable to most versions of left-
libertarianism. The point here is that the legitimacy of voluntary enslavement does not follow 
from self-ownership alone.4 
Nor is it clear that voluntary enslavement is illegitimate. It will seem so, if one thinks that 
a main concern of justice is to protect the possession of effective autonomy. On the other hand, if 
one thinks that a main concern of justice is to protect the exercise of autonomy, it is not. For a 
well-informed decision to sell oneself into slavery (e.g., for a large sum of money to help one’s 
needy family) is an exercise of autonomy.  Indeed, under desperate conditions it may even 
represent an extremely important way of exercising one’s autonomy. The parallel with suicide is 
relevant here. In both cases an agent makes a decision that has the result that he/she ceases to 
have any moral autonomy, and thus ceases to exercise any. In both cases it will typically be one 
of the most important choices in the agent’s life. Genuinely voluntary enslavement on this view 
6 
is simply the limiting case of the sorts of partial voluntary enslavement that occurs when we 
make binding promises and agreements (e.g., to join the military).5 
A second objection to full self-ownership concerns the obligation to help the needy. Here 
we must distinguish between an obligation to provide personal services (such as caring for an 
injured person) and an obligation to provide financial or external resources (e.g., the use of one’s 
car). As we shall see below, full self-ownership does not preclude the latter (since it does not 
involve the use of one’s person). It does, however, hold that in general agents have no 
enforceable non-contractual obligation to provide personal services to others—even when the 
others are desperately needy and the cost of helping is small (e.g., lifting an unconscious person 
out of the water). For, assuming that one has committed no relevant injustices, and made no 
relevant contractual commitments, justice does not permit others to coerce one into performing 
such actions. And yet, at least where we can provide significant help to a person who is needy 
through no fault of his/her own, and at a small cost to ourselves, it seems that we have an 
obligation to do so. 
 There are, however, several well-known ways of softening this objection. One is to agree 
that it is highly morally desirable that one help in these cases, but to insist that one has no 
obligation to do so. Another is to agree that one has an obligation to help, but to insist that it is 
not an enforceable obligation (an obligation that others may legitimately coerce you to fulfill). 
And an enforceable obligation to provide personal services to the needy is a case of forced 
service. Yet another way to soften the objection is to point out the radical implications of 
recognizing an enforceable obligation to help even in just these special cases (great benefit at 
small cost to provider). For there are typically a great number of people that would greatly benefit 
from an hour’s service everyday (or every week), and it’s not clear that we have an enforceable 
duty to provide such service.6 
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In summary, full self-ownership provides agents with important protection from being 
treated in various ways. One can, however, endorse a strong form of partial self-ownership 
without endorsing full self-ownership. For example, one could endorse all the rights of full self-
ownership except the right to renounce one’s rights and the right to refuse aid to the needy under 
certain conditions.7 Even this weakened form leaves some important protection for individuals. 
So a key issue to be resolved concerns how strong a form of self-ownership is plausible. 
Before considering views about how natural resources and artifacts are owned, we should 
note, however, that even full self-ownership on its own does not guarantee that agents have any 
effective freedom or any entitlement to their products. For agents such as ourselves, who need to 
use natural resources (space to stand in, air to breathe, etc.) to exist at all, it all depends on how 
natural resources are owned. For if all natural resources are fully (“maximally”) owned by others, 
justice does not allow one to do anything without their permission (to use their resources). And 
without their permission, one’s products may be owned by others (since they may be the result of 
one’s theft or trespass). So nothing of substance follows here from full self-ownership alone. We 
must therefore consider the ownership of natural resources.8 
 
4. THE OWNERSHIP OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND OF ARTIFACTS: 
APPROPRIATION AND TAXATION 
So far we have discussed the ownership of agents. We must now consider the ownership of 
natural resources (i.e., unproduced, non-agent resources, such as unproduced land, air, and water) 
and of artifacts (i.e., produced non-agent resources, such as buildings, cars, and increased fertility 
in land). Since natural resources are essential factors in any form of production, entitlements to 
them necessarily inform entitlements to produced goods: you cannot justifiably own things made 
from  stolen goods. As we shall see, all left-libertarian theories agree (as a matter of definition) 
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that natural resources are owned in some egalitarian manner. They disagree, however, on the 
form of this egalitarian ownership and consequently on the ownership of artifacts.9 
 According to one version of left-libertarianism, natural resources are jointly owned in the 
sense that authorization to use, or to appropriate, is given through some specified collective 
decision-making process (e.g., by majority or unanimous decision). One form of this approach—
advocated (seemingly, at least) by Grunebaum (1987)—holds that collective approval is needed 
for any use, as well as appropriation, of natural resources. But as Fressola (1981) and Cohen 
(1986, 1995) have argued, this is implausible, since it holds that, for agents like us, no one has 
the right to do anything (e.g., stand in a given spot, eat an apple, or even breathe) without 
authorization from other members of society. For every action requires the use of some natural 
resources (e.g., occupying a spatial location), and thus justice allows no one to do anything 
without approval from others. 
A more plausible form of joint ownership of natural resources—held perhaps by Grotius 
(1625) and Pufendorf (1672), and explored by Gibbard (1976)—holds that prior to any 
agreement justice permits agents to use natural resources in conformance with specified terms of 
common use, but they have no exclusive rights of use (no private ownership). Roughly, this 
means that justice permits them to use natural resources in various ways (occupy locations, 
breathe air, eat apples) as long as those resources are not then in use by others (and perhaps 
subject to certain conditions of sustainability), but they have no rights over any natural resources 
that they are not currently using. On this view, the initial rights over natural resources are like 
rights over public park benches. One has a right to use a resource (e.g., sit in one), but once one 
stops using it, one has no right to prevent others from using it. 
This is a fairly strong form of egalitarian ownership since the justness of appropriation is 
decided through collective decision-making. It denies that there is any fundamental right to full 
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private property in natural resources or in the objects that one produces with one’s labor. 
Everything depends on what is collectively agreed to. Many will object, however, to the 
implication that no appropriation (i.e. acquisition of exclusive rights of use) is just in the absence 
of actual collective agreement. It is implausible, they may claim, to hold that the consent of 
others is required for just appropriation when communication with others is impossible, 
extremely difficult, or expensive (as it almost always is). And even when communication is 
relatively easy and costless, it’s unclear why one needs the consent of others as long as one 
makes an appropriate compensatory payment for the natural resources appropriated. 
A different sort of approach holds that agents may use, or appropriate, unappropriated 
natural resources without the permission of others, but if they do so, they acquire certain 
enforceable obligations. This is the most common approach taken by left-libertarians, and we 
shall presently examine some of the different forms that it can take. But first we must see that 
some possible forms (but held by no one) are clearly implausible. An extreme form of this 
approach holds that anyone who uses natural resources (which is of course everyone) forfeits all 
rights of self-ownership (e.g., the right not to be assaulted). A slightly less extreme form allows 
agents to use natural resources subject to the rules of common use without any loss of self-
ownership, but holds that anyone who appropriates (claims rights of exclusive use over) natural 
resources forfeits all rights of self-ownership. Both these views hold that agents are “initially” 
full self-owners, and are thus “formally” versions of libertarianism. Neither is plausible because 
they allow self-ownership to be lost too easily. 
A plausible conception of the ownership of natural resources must be compatible with 
reasonably secure (not easily lost) self-ownership. At a minimum it should allow unappropriated 
resources to be used by agents without the permission of others and without any loss of the rights 
of self-ownership. More specifically, a plausible conception should be common-use-based in the 
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sense that (roughly) justice permits agents to use unappropriated natural resources as long as they 
violate no one’s self-ownership (nor, perhaps, certain constraints of fair use).10 On the most 
permissive conception of common use, the only constraint on use is the self-ownership of other 
agents. Agents are permitted by justice to breathe air, walk on unoccupied land, eat apples in no 
one's possession, and even to chop down trees, and burn down shelters others have built—as long 
as no one’s self-ownership is violated (e.g., by being assaulted or killed). A less permissive 
version of common use would also impose some constraints of fair use that rule out some kinds 
of use (e.g., continued possession of the sole source of water). Under common use, no one owns 
the resource (in the sense of having the right to exclude others from use), and the only constraint 
on use is self-ownership, and perhaps some constraint of fair use. 
Without some such condition of permissible use of natural resources, self-ownership has 
no real force, since it could be lost through the unavoidable use of natural resources. In addition, 
a plausible conception of the ownership of natural resources, many will argue, should be 
unilateralist in the sense of allowing agents to appropriate unappropriated natural resources 
without the consent of others—and with no loss of self-ownership—as long as they make an 
appropriate payment (to be discussed below).11 
In what follows, then, we shall consider some common-use-based, unilateralist 
conceptions of natural resource ownership (in conjunction with full self-ownership). Radical 
right-libertarians—such as Rothbard (1978, 1982) and Kirzner (1978)—hold that that there are 
no payment requirements for the appropriation of unappropriated resources. Agents are free to 
take ownership of whatever unappropriated natural resources they find (or mix their labor with). 
Obviously, this is a non-starter from an egalitarian viewpoint. Other right-libertarians—such as 
Nozick (1974)—hold that the only payment requirements are those of a quasi-Lockean proviso, 
which requires roughly that no individual be made worse off (in some appropriate sense) by the 
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appropriation (compared with the situation before appropriation). It seems quite plausible that 
satisfaction of some form of such a proviso is a necessary condition for just unilateral 
appropriation, but it is surely not sufficient for just appropriation. For private property rights over 
natural resources typically bring the owners benefits (even after making a payment to ensure that 
no one is made worse off). Consequently, people are willing to pay for these rights, and the rights 
have—relative to some specification of the morally relevant market conditions—a competitive 
value (based on demand and supply). There is no reason why an appropriator should be immune 
from paying for this competitive value. 
There are many important issues concerning exactly how competitive value is determined 
by supply and demand. The Appendix briefly identifies some of the key questions. In what 
follows we shall simply assume that we have a fixed conception of competitive value. 
Georgist libertarians—such as eponymous George (1879, 1892), Steiner (1977, 1980, 
1981, 1992, 1994), and Tideman (1991, 1997, 1998)12—hold that agents may appropriate 
unappropriated natural resources as long as they pay for the competitive value of the rights they 
claim.13 If, as we are assuming for the moment, there is only one generation of agents, then these 
rights could be purchased outright. If, however, there are multiple generations, it could be argued 
that the most plausible version of this approach requires that rights over natural resources be 
rented (as opposed to purchased) at the competitive rent value so as to ensure that for each 
generation the total payment equals current competitive value.14 For simplicity, since this is the 
most common version, we shall assume the rent model in what follows. 
Georgist libertarianism holds that agents must pay the full competitive value of the 
natural resources that they appropriate, but it also holds that agents fully own their products 
(artifacts) once they have paid their rent and fulfilled any other contractual obligations. For 
agents who produce more—because they work longer hours or because they are more efficient 
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producers due to greater productive talents—pay the same taxes (rent) as those with less 
advantageous unchosen personal endowments who own equally valuable natural resources. 
Those with strong egalitarian inclinations will reject this view, and hold that persons with greater 
unchosen advantage should pay higher taxes, since they can reap greater benefits from natural 
resources.15 
Most such egalitarians may grant that the payment of competitive rent is a necessary 
condition for just appropriation, but they will deny that it is a sufficient condition. A natural way 
of modifying the Georgist position to take into account the above consideration is to hold that, in 
addition to paying the competitive rent, appropriators must pay a tax equal to up to 100% of the 
net benefits (net of the competitive rent) that they reap from appropriation.16 Of course, in 
practice it is not viable to tax agents 100% of such benefits. The required information about 
benefits is impossible to obtain and even enough information for rough approximations would be 
very costly to obtain. Furthermore, 100% taxation leaves no incentive to make productive use of 
natural resources (since it leaves no net benefit to the agent). For these reasons, the full-benefit-
taxation approach should be understood as setting a maximum tax that can be charged. The actual 
tax charged will be whatever maximizes net tax revenues (after deducting administrative 
expenses). 
Consider then the full-benefit-taxation conception of natural resource ownership. This is 
like the Georgist view considered above except that, in addition to paying competitive rent, 
appropriators must pay taxes (up to 100%) on the benefits they reap from appropriation. This 
approach has the effect of treating all benefits of applying personal talents to appropriated natural 
resources as social assets. Although it holds that agents own the products of their labors after 
paying the competitive rent and full-benefit-taxation (and for other factors used in production), 
full-benefit-taxation wipes out the benefits that such rights provide to the producer. 
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Full-benefit-taxation is, however, compatible with full self-ownership. First, as we have 
seen, any assumption about the ownership of natural resources is compatible with full self-
ownership. Second and more importantly, this view of the ownership of natural resources is 
compatible with a relatively secure self-ownership. For, like the Georgist conception, it imposes 
the enforceable financial obligations only on those who appropriate natural resources. Agents are 
free to use unappropriated natural resources under the terms of common use without acquiring 
any enforceable obligation to pay rent or benefit taxes. It is thus possible for agents to avoid 
having to pay the tax.17 
Something in the general area of Georgist libertarianism and full-benefit-taxation 
libertarianism is, I believe, promising for liberal egalitarianism. They each avoid the problem of 
requiring the consent of others to use unappropriated natural resources by holding that common 
use is permitted by justice and involves no loss of any rights of self-ownership. The two 
conceptions also hold that appropriation of natural resources without the consent of others—and 
with no loss of self-ownership—is legitimate as long as appropriators pay the relevant rent and 
taxes. The key difference between Georgism and full-benefit taxation concerns whether agents 
are entitled to the net benefits of appropriation (net of competitive rent). Georgism only requires 
agents to pay competitive rent, and thus typically allows agents to benefit from appropriation 
(with agents with greater productive capacities typically reaping greater benefits). Full benefit-
taxation, on the other hand, taxes away up to the full benefit of appropriation.18 
 Neither Georgist libertarianism, nor full-benefit-taxation libertarianism, is a form of pure 
egalitarianism. For their endorsement of full self-ownership does some real work in limiting the 
admissible ways in which equality may be promoted.19 On these views, agents may not be killed, 
tortured, or assaulted without their consent if they have committed no past injustices. Nor may 
they be coerced into providing involuntary services for others (e.g., mandatory labor for the 
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state). Nor do agents owe any taxes merely because they exist or because they use natural 
resources. Nor are taxes imposed that effectively require agents to work in their most productive 
capacity (e.g., the “tax slavery” that results if each person owes an annual tax equal to the value 
of his/her maximally valuable annual product). If, however, agents appropriate natural resources, 
then they must pay the competitive rent, plus perhaps taxes equal to up to the full value of the net 
benefit from appropriation. 
Purist egalitarians will reject the above two approaches and hold that anyone who uses 
natural resources thereby incurs the enforceable obligation to do whatever is necessary to 
maximally promote equality. Although such an approach is formally compatible with (initial) full 
self-ownership, it gives no real role to self-ownership, since agents must use some natural 
resources (e.g., to stand on or to breathe), and hence immediately lose their self-ownership. More 
weakly, one could hold that the enforceable obligation to promote equality maximally is incurred 
by anyone who appropriates (as opposed to uses) natural resources. This leaves some real role 
for self-ownership, since in principle agents could decide not to appropriate. But it has the result 
that appropriators may lose some of their rights of self-ownership, and be subject, under certain 
conditions, to forced service (e.g., when their skills are needed by society), forced transfer of 
body parts (e.g., organs for a disadvantaged person), or even torture (e.g., when it provides 
important medical information that reduces the suffering of the disadvantaged). Because these 
implications seem implausible, nothing more demanding than full benefit-taxation (or something 
like it) seems promising for liberal egalitarians.  
 
5. THE OWNERSHIP OF NATURAL RESOURCES: SPENDING THE SOCIAL FUND 
So far we have considered what the appropriate payment is for appropriation of natural resources. 
We now need to address the question of how the social fund generated by rents and taxes is 
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spent. Most standard theories of justice (e.g., utilitarianism, mutual advantage contractarianism, 
envy-freeness and related principles) can be invoked here as theories of spending policy (but not 
of taxation). Because we are focusing on left-libertarianism, which by definition involves some 
form of egalitarianism, I shall limit my remarks to egalitarian theories of spending. And when 
addressing theories that focus on the well-being of agents, I shall assume that the focus is on the 
opportunity for well-being rather than actual well-being. The latter kinds of approach do not 
appropriately hold agents responsible for their choices.20 
On the equal share conception—advocated by Arthur (1987), Steiner (1994), and 
Tideman (1991, 1997, 1998), and discussed by Kolm (1985, 1986)—the social fund is divided 
equally among all agents in society. This view is not concerned with the impact on people’s well-
being, and it does not require compensation for individuals with disadvantages in their personal 
or situational endowments (their genes, the environment in which they were raised, etc.).21 This 
lack of concern for effective equality of opportunity for a good life will strike many egalitarians 
as implausible. Of course, if it is combined with the full-benefit-taxation approach to 
appropriation, the more advantaged will pay higher taxes than the less advantaged, but typically 
(e.g., for incentive reasons) the higher taxes will not completely eliminate the differential benefit. 
And even if they did, equal sharing of the social fund does not guarantee effectively equal 
opportunity for a good life. Some people, through no fault of their own, may benefit less from 
their share of the spending than others do (e.g., those who are genetically morose).22 
 On the equal gains in well-being conception the social fund is spent so as to give each 
person an equal gain in the value of their opportunities for well-being from the spending. Unlike 
the equal share conception, it is sensitive to the impact that spending has on the opportunities for 
a good life, and seeks to give everyone an equal gain. A crucial question, of course, concerns the 
relevant conception of well-being, and whether well-being is—as required by this approach—
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cardinally measurable and interpersonally comparable in units.23 Even if welfare is so 
measurable, many egalitarians reject this view for being inadequately egalitarian. For it requires 
no compensation for unchosen disadvantages in the prespending levels of well-being. A person 
with a low level of prespending opportunity for well-being (e.g., with an unchosen depressive 
disposition) is given the same well-being benefit (gain) as a person with a high level of 
prespending opportunity for well-being, and that is arguably implausible. Any plausible 
egalitarian spending policy will, it will be argued, be concerned with well-being levels and not 
merely with well-being gains. 
 A third view of how the social fund should be spent is the equality of opportunity for 
well-being view. It holds that the social fund should be spent so as to promote equality of 
opportunity for well-being as much as possible. It focuses spending so as to improve the 
opportunities for a good life of those with relatively unfavorable genetic or situational 
endowments, and spends little or nothing (except for instrumental reasons) on those with 
relatively favorable endowments.24 
 So within left-libertarian theory there is room for disagreement about the manner in which 
the social fund generated by the value of natural resources is to be divided. The equal share view 
takes a resourcist stance, whereas the equal gains in well-being view and the equal opportunity for 
well-being take welfarist stances. 
 
6. OUTSTANDING ISSUES 
So far we have been assuming that the only beings with moral standing are rational agents, that 
there is only a single society, and only a single generation of agents. It is now time to discuss 
briefly the issues that need to be confronted when these assumptions are relaxed. 
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6.1 The Significance of National Boundaries 
It is perhaps possible for a left-libertarian theory to hold that the members of each country own 
the underlying natural resources in some egalitarian manner. Few, if any, contemporary left-
libertarians, however, would endorse such a view. For the very reasons that militate against any 
individual reaping the full benefit that ownership of natural resource provides, also militate 
against any group of individuals reaping these benefits. Furthermore, at the most fundamental 
level, national boundaries are morally arbitrary (although of course for administrative purposes 
they are certainly important in many ways). So, most contemporary left-libertarians hold that all 
natural resources in the world are owned by all the agents in the world. The funds generated by 
natural resources should be shared (e.g., equally, or to promote equality) among all individuals in 
the world. 
 
6.2 Beings with Partial Moral Standing 
Libertarianism holds that full agents fully own themselves and that they are entitled to a share of 
the benefits of natural resources. On any plausible view agents are not the only beings with moral 
standing. I shall assume here that any being that is either sentient or has at least a minimal level 
of agency has moral standing. Libertarian theories, like all theories of justice, thus need to take a 
stance on the status of: (1) sentient beings with no potential for agency (e.g., more primitive 
animals and severely mentally deficient humans), (2) sentient beings with no agency but with the 
potential for full agency (e.g., normal 12-week old fetuses and infants), and (3) sentient beings 
with partial agency (e.g., children and great apes). There are two questions: (1) Do they own 
themselves at least partially? (2) Are they among the beings who are entitled to a share of the 
benefits of natural resources. 
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 One possible position is to hold that such beings have moral standing, but that they have 
no standing with respect to justice. This is roughly to say that their will and their interests are 
relevant for assessing what is morally permissible, but not for determining what is just. For at 
least many kinds of being with partial moral standing (e.g., children), this will seem highly 
implausible to most. 
 With respect to the constraints on the treatment of sentient but not fully autonomous 
beings, one approach is to ascribe quasi-self-ownership to sentient beings with no agency, where 
this is just like self-ownership except that infringements are permitted when and only when they 
do not harm the being. This would in effect be a constraint against certain kinds of treatment 
except when it does not harm them. If these sentient beings have partial agency, then it could be 
further held that their consent is relevant for issues falling within the domain of their agency). 
Another approach is to give a different kind of status (not based on ownership) to sentient beings 
who are not fully autonomous. One could hold, for example, that it is unjust to harm these beings 
except when there is a sufficient offsetting benefit to others (a sort of quasi-utilitarian 
consideration). Obviously, there are many possibilities here. 
 With respect to sharing in the benefits of egalitarian ownership of natural resources, most 
of the questions that left-libertarianism must confront must be confronted by any egalitarian 
theory of justice. On an equal share view, for example, does each mouse in the world get a share 
equal to that of each adult human? On the equal opportunity for well-being view, must the funds 
be spent primarily on members of species that are genetically limited in their capacity for well-
being (e.g., mice)? Any sensible egalitarianism will answer negatively to each of these questions, 
but it’s not clear what a principled answer would look like. Much work is needed in this area.  
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6.3 Future Generations 
The possible existence of multiple generations raises many distinct issues that left-
libertarianism—and any other theory of justice—must deal with. 
 One question concerns the duty of justice to provide resources for those that one 
procreates (the duties of parents). Under many conditions adding an additional person to the 
world can reduce the resources to which others are legitimately entitled according to left-
libertarianism. On an equal share view, it increases the number of people entitled to an equal 
share. On an equality of opportunity view, if the person is particularly disadvantaged in his/her 
opportunities, he/she may be entitled to payments that others would have otherwise received. Of 
course, the net impact also depends on whether adding the person also changes the value of the 
fund to be divided up. But at least under some conditions, adding a person can reduce the 
entitlements of others. One view of this matter holds that parents are not accountable for any 
such reduction in the resources of others. Another view is that parents are fully accountable, and 
that justice does not permit procreation unless one provides enough resources to one’s offspring 
to ensure that they are not a drain on the social fund. The key issue here is whether negative 
externalities generated by procreation, if any, should be born by the parents.25 
 A second question concerns whether those currently alive have any duty of justice to 
preserve and pass on to later generations the resources that they own in the specified egalitarian 
manner. One answer is that people who do not now exist have no rights and are owed nothing. 
Left-libertarians, however, generally believe that individuals have an enforceable obligation to 
preserve the value of the natural resources (e.g., by having rent include payments to a fund for 
any depletion or deterioration of natural resources). Most left-libertarians would deny, however, 
that there is an enforceable obligation to preserve the value of the artifacts that one creates. They 
generally hold that one is free to destroy the wealth that one creates. More controversial among 
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left-libertarians is whether there is an enforceable obligation to preserve the value of the 
artifactual wealth inherited from previous generations. If such wealth was abandoned (e.g., not 
transferred to anyone alive today), then most left-libertarians would hold that it is to be treated in 
the same manner as natural resources. As we shall now see, there is room for disagreement about 
whether artifactual wealth can be legitimately transferred by gift or bequest to others. 
 Consider then the question of how gifts (including bequests) to members of later 
generations are to be treated. The issue of gifts arises, of course, even in the case of a single 
generation. Most left-libertarians, however, will likely hold that, if there is just a single 
generation, then no injustice is done if all start with their fair share of resources, and then some 
benefit from gifts while others do not. The crucial issue concerns the transmission of resources to 
a person in a later generation where this reduces the equality of starting positions (e.g., the effects 
of wealth dynasties). 
 A first point to note concerns bequests, that is gifts from dead people. As Steiner (1992, 
1994) has argued, dead people do not have rights, and hence left-libertarianism need not, and 
arguably should not, recognize (except on practical grounds) the validity of bequests. Any assets 
owned by a person at death are deemed abandoned, and such assets arguably become—along 
with natural resources—part of the pool of resources that are owned in some egalitarian manner 
(just as the assets of some defunct society of the distant past become part of this pool).26  
 A second point to note concerns inter vivos gifts of external resources, that is, of natural 
resources or artifacts (as opposed to personal services). Although left-libertarianism is committed 
to full self-ownership—and hence the right to make gifts of one’s personal services—it need not 
be committed to private ownership of artifacts. Furthermore, even if private ownership of 
artifacts is allowed, it need not be full private ownership. It may not include the power to transfer 
by gift.27 
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 A third point to note concerns the right to acquire property by means of a gift. As we saw 
above in the discussion of voluntary enslavement, the right to transfer property to others does not 
guarantee that others have the power to acquire those rights by means of transfer. That is a 
separate question. It thus open to left-libertarianism to hold that people do not have the right to 
acquire property by gift. This is not to say that left-libertarianism would prohibit all receptions of 
gifts. It is only to say that it could hold that no one’s rights would be violated if this were done. 
Any sensible left-libertarian theory will allow gift-giving and gift-receiving. The issue here is 
whether such transactions may be legitimately subjected to taxation and other restrictions. 
 So, left-libertarian theories can, but need not, endorse the right to transfer rights by gift 
and the right to acquire rights by gift. It will depend on how they wish to treat the inequalities 
generated by such transfers. There are many stances that can be taken here. One view is that there 
is no right to receive (or make) gifts free of taxation.28 Another is that people have a right to 
receive free of taxation any gifts made to them by people no older than themselves, but no right 
to receive free of taxation any gifts made to them by people who are older. This view holds that it 
is only transmissions of wealth to subsequent generations that are morally problematic.29 Another 
view holds that people have a right to make and receive gifts, free of taxation, as long as the gift 
is drawn from wealth that the donor owned and created, but that people have no right to make or 
receive gifts when the gift is drawn from wealth that donor received as a gift (e.g., inheritance).30 
 
6.4 Dealing with the Imperfect World 
Two other issues that need to be addressed more fully concern the implications of left-
libertarianism in an imperfect world (e.g., where people’s knowledge is limited and their 
motivation to be just less than full). 
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 First, if left-libertarian principles were implemented, what compensation, if any, is owed 
to those who lose their (illegitimate) legal rights over natural resources. This is a question of who 
should bear the transition cost from the unjust world to the just world. The issue is very similar to 
the question that arose when slavery was outlawed in the U.S.. On the one hand, the legal owners 
had no moral right to the legal rights they claimed. On the other hand, they may have invested a 
lot of hard work and savings on the assumption that they would continue to have those legal 
rights. Various views are possible ranging from no compensation to partial compensation to full 
compensation. And there are also various views about who owes the compensation. It may, for 
example, be  the social fund, the persons who sold the current owners those rights, or the current 
beneficiaries of the original unjust appropriation. 
 A second issue concerns the question of to whom the taxes (rent for natural resources, gift 
taxes, or whatever) are owed. It cannot simply be the government. For governments can be 
corrupt and grossly inefficient, and in any case they are not the ultimate holders of the 
entitlements involved. If agents owe their taxes to individuals directly (and via governments only 
when this is an efficient way of discharging those obligations), then do they merely have to set 
aside the appropriate amounts and make payments to anyone who comes forward with a 
legitimate claim? Or must they actively seek out legitimate claimants? If the latter, are the 
administrative costs of seeking claimants born by the agent or are they deducted from the 
payments owed? And how should this be coordinated on an international scale? 
 Obviously, there are many other issues that a full left-libertarian theory must address. 
Enough has been said here, I hope, to indicate the range of issues that need to be considered. 
 
23 
7. CONCLUSION 
Left-libertarianism is a form of liberal egalitarianism. It holds that natural resources are owned in 
some egalitarian manner and that full self-ownership imposes constraints on how agents may be 
treated. As we have seen, there are many forms that the egalitarian ownership of natural 
resources can take. The resulting theories range from radically left-wing to slightly left of center. 
As the readings in this volume should make clear, the hard work lies in articulating and 
defending a specific version of left-libertarianism.31 
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Appendix: Competitive Value 
The competitive value of a given set of rights over a given set of resources is the value, 
determined by supply and demand, for those rights relative to a given initial set of rights (which 
determines bidding power). In order to specify fully a conception of competitive value each of 
the following questions must be answered.  
(1) What is the prior allocation of rights (and hence bidding power) relative to which demand and 
supply operate? It cannot simply be the prevailing legal distribution of rights (e.g. wealth), since 
these may be (and typically are) the result of all sorts of past injustice. Nor can it simply be an 
equal share of the resources at issue (or equal bidding power), since there may be (and typically 
are) all sorts of just inequalities arising from past choices (e.g., about the amount to save or the 
amount of time to labor). A natural approach is to appeal to the prevailing legal distribution of 
rights, but adjusted for past injustices. The adjustment for past injustices, of course, will involve 
appealing to the hypothetical outcomes that would have occurred had past injustices not 
occurred. Ultimately, this will involve something like an appeal to the “initial” rights of self-
ownership and the “initial” rights to use and appropriate natural resources under specified 
conditions along with adjustments for each historical violation. 
(2) What exactly are the rights over natural resources at issue? Full ownership rights or 
something less than that? 
(3) Is the competitive value of a set of rights over a given set of natural resources based on the 
demand for the the rights over the resources taken as a package or based on the demand for those 
rights over the resources broken down into the smallest feasible units (e.g., based on bids for an 
entire tract of land vs. bids based on the smallest feasible parcels thereof)? With externalities and 
decreasing marginal utility, these two approaches can yield quite different results. 
(4) Are coalitions allowed in the bidding process, or are only individual bids allowed?  
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(5) How exactly is the competitive value (of a set of rights over resources) determined given the 
demand and supply? For natural resources, there is a fixed supply, so we can here focus solely on 
how the competitive value is determined by demand. A first-price auction takes the competitive 
value to be the highest price that someone would pay. This leaves no benefit to the purchaser. A 
second-price auction takes the competitive value to be the second highest price that someone 
would pay. This leaves a benefit to purchasers if and only if they would be willing to pay the 
highest price. An intermediate approach is to appeal to a market-clearing price, which is a price 
that is low enough so that none of the resources would be left unsold at that price and high 
enough so that no wants to buy more at that price. Where the resources are fixed in supply (as 
they are with natural resources), there will typically be a range of market clearing prices. The 
highest price that someone would pay is a market-clearing price, but so are lower prices as long 
as they are high enough so that no one would wish to purchase an additional unit of the resource. 
The market-clearing price is always be no lower than the second highest price that someone 
would pay for the original unit. (It will be higher, for example, in a two-person case where Smith 
would pay $20 for the original unit, and $15 for an additional one, and Jones would pay only $10 
for the original unit. Where there is only the original unit, any price between $15 and $20 is 
market-clearing. $10 is the second highest price for the original unit.) If the skills and preferences 
are jointly distributed among agents in a “continuous fashion” (in the sense that for any agent 
there is another agent with virtually identical skills and preferences), then there will be little 
difference among these three approaches. 
(6) How is the possibility of indeterminate competitive value dealt with? Even given a fully 
precise specification of competitive value, where there is more than one kind of resource there 
can be more than one competitive equilibrium. Hence that the competitive value can be 
indeterminate. This is because the competitive value for one resource depends on that of others, 
26 
and there may be several distinct sets of prices that produce the relevant competitive equilibrium. 
Possible ways of dealing with this include taking the highest competitive value, taking the 
lowest, or taking all competitive values as admissible (and thus leaving the notion of competitive 
value somewhat indeterminate). 
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 NOTES  
 
 
1
 For a selection of the most important left-libertarian writings of these authors, see Vallentyne 
and Steiner (2001). 
2
 My analysis of self-ownership and of ownership of natural resources draws heavily on the 
deeply insightful work of Cohen (1995). Many of the points made here were first made in 
Vallentyne (1998). 
3
 The thesis that agents are full self-owners is the thesis that agents fully own themselves. What 
exactly is owned thus depends on the nature of agents. It is generally assumed that they own their 
entire bodies, but this depends on a certain of agent identity. Furthermore, exactly what agent 
self-ownership involves with respect to their mental life is a bit unclear. We shall not worry 
about these matters here. 
4
 Of course, many will still object to the power to renounce one’s rights over oneself, and so 
there is still a debatable issue about the alienability of one’s rights over one’s person. 
5
 For further defense of the right of voluntary enslavement see: Steiner (1994), pp. 232-34, and 
Nozick (1974), p. 331. For criticism, see Ingram (1994), pp. 38-9, Kuflik (1984), McConnell 
(1984, 1996), and Grunebaum (1987), pp. 170-71. Note that Locke (1689) (vol. 2, sec. 23) 
rejected the right of self-enslavement on the grounds that the rights involved belonged to God. 
More strikingly, note that radical right-libertarian Rothbard (1982) rejects this right (p. 40) on the 
grounds that one cannot alienate one’s will. This is true, but irrelevant. For one can alienate the 
right-making powers of one’s will (consent).  
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6
 Many of the issues discussed in the preceding paragraphs depend on whether rights are viewed 
as protecting choices or interests. For discussion of this matter see, for example, Steiner (1994, 
ch. 3) and Kramer, Simmonds and Steiner (1998). 
7
 Grunebaum (1987) defends this weakened form of self-ownership, and Kolm (1985, 1996a) 
suggests that nothing stronger than it is plausible. Christman (1994) defends mere control self-
ownership, which is much weaker still. 
8
 The best discussions the relation of self-ownership to the ownership of natural resources are: 
Christman (1994), Cohen (1995), Grunebaum (1987), Kolm (1985, 1986, 1996a), Kymlicka 
(1990), Moulin and Roemer (1989), Roemer (1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1996), Steiner (1994), and 
Van Parijs (1991, 1992, 1995). In addition to the works cited below, see: Ackerman (1980), 
Arneson (1991), Attas (1999), Becker (1977), Borovali (1998), Carter (1999), Gauss (1994), 
Gorr (1995), Kagan (1994), Kramer, Simmonds, and Steiner (1998), Levine (1988), Mack (1983, 
1990, 1995), Peirce (1999), Reeve (1986), Simmons (1992), Thomson (1990), Waldron (1988), 
and Wheeler (1980). 
9
 In general, left-libertarians attach great significance to the difference between external resources 
that are produced (artifacts) and those that are not (natural resources). They do not, however, 
attach much significance to the functional difference (emphasized by Marxists) between external 
resources that are used for production (the means of production; e.g. an unproduced bed of coal, 
or a [produced] machine) and those that are used for consumption (consumer goods; e.g., an 
unproduced lake used for leisure, or a shirt).  
10
 See Mavrodes (1974) and Fressola (1981) for enlightening discussions of the rules of common 
use and related forms of ownership of natural resources. 
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11
 I leave open here what agents must do in addition to making an appropriate payment. The most 
plausible view, I believe, simply requires that they stake a claim (assert certain rights). The 
payment owed would thus depend on what rights are claimed. Other possible views are that 
agents must discover the natural resource, or that they must mix their labor with it. Although I 
believe neither of these views to be plausible, for generality I leave open this issue. 
12
 Van Parijs (1995) also defends charging competitive rent for the appropriation of natural 
resources. He is not, however, a Georgist libertarian because he endorses charging rent on (or 
taxes equal to up to 100% of the value of) all non-personal assets that were “given” to an agent 
(as opposed to produced by him/her). He includes gifts from humans as well as gifts from nature 
(other than initial personal endowments) in the rent/tax base. He argues furthermore that 
employment rents—wages in excess of the market clearing wage—are a significant source of 
gifts. 
13
 For discussion of the views of Henry George, and of contemporary Georgist economists, see: 
Andelson (1991), Harrison, Hudson, Miller and Feder (1994), Tideman (1994), and Wenzer 
(1997a). 
14
 An alternative is to require the purchase price to be sufficient so that, if invested, the interest 
each year will be sufficient to pay the rent. Borovali (1998) defends this approach. Some would 
object to it on the ground that, due to unexpected increases in the value of natural resources, the 
interest may not be sufficient to pay the rent. 
15
 Steiner (1994, 1997, 1999) argues that one’s germ-line genes (as opposed, for example to 
genetic modifications made by oneself or one’s parents) is in effect a natural resource and subject 
to the payment of competitive rent. 
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16
 There are several important issues left open here concerning the nature of the benefits that are 
taxed. One is whether the benefits in question are realized benefits (e.g., money earned) or 
“reasonably realizable” benefits (e.g., money that reasonably could be earned) from the 
appropriation. This makes a difference concerning the tax owed by a person who, because of 
special talents, could reasonably realize a benefit (net of competitive rent), but fails to do so 
because she wastes her opportunities. Another question concerns whether the benefits in question 
are construed in material terms (e.g., money or apples) or in subjective terms (e.g., happiness). If 
only material benefits are considered, then the benefits of higher productive capacities may be 
taxed away, but the benefits of higher consumptive capacities (capacity to benefit, capacity for 
well-being) will not be subject to any tax. These are deep questions that I cannot address here. In 
practice a feasible approach—given our limited information—would probably be limited to 
taxing realized material benefits. 
17
 As far as I know full-benefit-taxation libertarianism has not been explicitly defended by 
anyone (although the general idea is not new). The following, however, are some closely related 
approaches: Brody (1983) argues that the benefits of appropriation may be taxed to ensure that 
everyone gets a self-interestedly mutually advantageous share of the benefits. Christman (1994) 
defends control self-ownership, but denies that agents (even non-appropriators) have any right to 
the income they generate. White (1998) accepts control self-ownership, but argues that agents 
owe taxes on their income at a rate (varying depending their talents) that equalizes post-tax 
potential income. Otsuka (1998) argues that a robust right of self-ownership (encompassing full 
control rights and payment immunities) is compatible with a principle of just appropriation 
according to which agents are free to appropriate only as much resources as is compatible with 
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equality of opportunity for welfare (and thus less appropriation is permitted for more talented 
agents). 
18
 Steiner (1994, 1997, 1999) seeks to extend Georgism in a way that reduces the distributive 
differences between it and full-benefit-taxation with respect to talent differentials. He proposes 
taxation of the talent-producing value of children’s genetic endowments —inasmuch as these can 
be counted as natural resources—with that revenue distributed in proportion to genetic 
disadvantage. 
19
 Thus, because of its endorsement of full self-ownership, even full-benefit-taxation 
libertarianism, combined with a radical equality of opportunity spending policy, differs from the 
unconstrained forms of egalitarianism of Arneson (1989, 1990), Cohen (1989), and Roemer 
(1993, 1996). 
20
 For a defense of the focus on the opportunity for well-being, see Arneson (1989, 1990), Cohen 
(1989), Van Parijs (1995), and Roemer (1993, 1996). They rightly argue that, if individuals 
choose to develop expensive tastes or to squander their resources, they alone should bear the 
costs (and no equalization is needed for inequalities so generated). There are, of course, many 
other important questions that need to be addressed here. One question concerns the relevant 
measure of well-being (or the good life): happiness, preference satisfaction, functionings, 
primary goods, or some perfectionist ideal. See, for example, the discussion of this general issue 
in: Arneson (1989, 1990), Cohen (1989), Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), Rakowski (1991), Rawls 
(1971), Roemer (1985, 1986, 1993, 1996), Sen (1980, 1992), and Van Parijs (1990, 1995). 
21
 The view of Steiner (1994, 1997, 1999) is more complex that this suggests. For, although he 
advocates equal divisions of the general social fund, he holds that the funds generated by his 
gene tax are to be distributed in proportion to genetic disadvantage. 
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22
 Dworkin (1981b) advocates the equal division of natural resources. To compensate for unequal 
personal endowments he advocates hypothetical insurance. For criticism of this insurance 
approach see Roemer (1985, 1996). 
23
 For recent articles on interpersonal comparisons, see Elster and Roemer (1991). 
24
 Something like this view is advocated by Brown (1977), Sartorius (1984), Otsuka (1998), and 
Van Parijs (1995). Van Parijs advocates equal division, but only after compensation for 
inequalities in personal endowments (as measured by his criterion of universal domination). 
25
 See, for example, the discussions in Ackerman (1980, ch. 7), George (1987), Rakwoski (1991, 
ch. 7), and Casal and Williams (1995). 
26
 Colins (1835) and Huet (1853) also hold that there is no power of bequest (or no power to 
receive the benefits of any bequests made). 
27
 Of course, if the power to make gifts of personal services, but no power to make gifts of 
artifacts is recognized, there will be a problem of leakage. Many of the economic benefits of 
receiving artifactual gifts will be accomplished by means of gifts of personal services. 
28
 Roughly this view is defended by Sreenivasan (1995), Van Parijs (1992, 1995), and Varian 
(1975). 
29
 Ackerman (1980) holds roughly this view. Something like this view of gifts may also be 
implicit in Colins (1835) and Huet (1853). 
30
 Something like this is the view of Rignano (1924) and Nozick (1989). For related discussion on 
the taxation of gifts and bequests, see: Chester (1982), Haslett (1988), Munzer (1990), and 
Rakowski (1991, 1996). 
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